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A NE W ECONOMIC THEORY OF
REGULATION: RENT EXTRACTION
RATHER THAN RENT CREATION
Douglas Ginsburg*
MoNEY FOR NoTinNG: PoLmc1ANs, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION. By Fred S. McChesney. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1997 . Pp. xi, 2 16. $3 5.

O nce upon a time, people believed that the government regu
lated various indus tries in " the public i nterest." The idea was that
certain conditions , s uch as " natural monopoly" or the ability to ex
ternalize significant cos ts , caus ed markets to fail and governments
to step in to correct that failure.1
Econmnic regulation predicated upon market fai lure can be
dated conveniently to the Inters tate Commerce Act of 1887 ,2 in
which the Congress established the Inters tate Commerce Commis
sion to regulate railroads in the i nterests of s hippers , principally
farmers and small business es .3 The legal notion of " affectation with
the public interes t" dates back much further, of cours e;4 and the
concept of " market failure" was not introduced in thos e terms until
a good deal later.5 But it is a us eful s implification to s ay that for
roughly eighty years (1885-1965), the market failure s tory, couched
in various terms , was widely accepted.6
Toward the end of that period, however, econmnists began to
point out certain problems with the s tory. For example, some noted
that there was no plausible claim of market failure in certain regu
lated i ndustries , such as motor carriers and airlines , sugges ting that
regulation mus t be explained by some other factor.7 A nd, in an
indus try in which the market failure s tory seemed facially plausible
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. - Ed.
1. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND !Ts REFORM 15-28 (1982).
2. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
3. See HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 132-33
(1991).
4. See Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
5. See, e.g., A.C. Pmou, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912); A.C. Pmou, THE ECONOMICS
OF WELFARE 129-30 (4th ed. 1948).
6. See Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. EcoN. 351 (1958).
7. See, e.g., GEORGE W. DouGLAS & JAMES C. Mn.LER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
DoMESTic AIR. TRANSPORT: THEORY AND PouCY 45 (1974); 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE Eco
NOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 190-93 & nn.58-60 (1971).
*
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- local distribution of electricity - George Stigler and Claire
Friedland cast doubt upon the assumption that regulation had any
appreciable effect upon price.8 Indeed, by the early 1970s, alterna
tive explanations for, or ways of understanding, economic regu
lation were emerging with some frequency.9
The new learning that emerged in the early 1970s as "the eco
nomic theory of regulation" can justly be attributed to George
Stigler, which is not to say that important refinements were not ad
ded by others. It proceeds from the historical observation that reg
ulation was in many instances sought by, rather than imposed upon,
the regulated industry, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the
public interest story.10 In the new learning, regulation, whether
sought by industry or imposed upon it, "is designed and operated
primarily for [the regulated firms'] benefit,"11 and to the consum
ers' detriment. Regulation generates rents for the regulated indus
try, paid for by consumers, of which the politicians get a portion in
the form of contributions from the regulated firms.12 In Fred
McChesney's13 succinct synopsis of the Stiglerian model: "If ex
pected political rents net of the costs of organizing and procuring
favorable regulation are positive, then producers will demand regu
lation. If payments sufficient to compensate politicians for the costs
of creating regulation are forthcoming, they will supply it" (p. 9).
In other words, regulation is an item of trade, supplied by politi
cians who traffic in the state's monopoly on the use of force, and
demanded by producers who can use regulation to extract rents
from consumers. Regulation occurs because consumers, being nu8. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of
Electricity, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1962).
9. See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Bridger M. Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The FCC
and Cable Television, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 177 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation,
2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMr. SCI. 22 (1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula·
tion, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMr. SCI. 3 (1971).
10. See Stigler, supra note 9, at 3.
11. Id.
12. Regulation can create rents in two ways. Frrst, regulation can create monopolies or
stable cartels, which allow producers to lower output, increase price above marginal cost, and
capture increased profits. "It is the state's ability to apply the force of law to any monopoliz·
ing arrangement that frequently makes regulation a superior mechanism for creating rents."
P. 11. Second, regulation can create rents "inframarginally." As McChesney explains:
[R]egulatory measures are identified that increase costs for all firms, but proportionately
more for marginal firms
A regulation increasing the cost of labor, for example, will
affect firms with relatively large capital investments less than those using proportionately
more labor than capital in production. Higher overall costs due to regulation mean
higher prices to consumers, and so a lower quantity produced. Reduced quantities mean
that rents earned on some existing production will be lost because of regulation. But for
capital intensive producers, costs may rise less than prices do, creating new rents exceed·
ing the old rents lost. To inframarginal, capital-intensive producers, regulation is advan·
tageous . . . .
P. 15 (citations omitted).
13. Professor, Cornell Law School.
. . . •
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merous and each having a small stake in preventing it, are typically
not organized as effectively as producers and hence systematically
lose in the legislative struggle.
The economic theory of regulation is as familiar and obvious to
lawyers and economists educated in the last twenty-five years as
was the market failure story to the immediately preceding genera
tion. Now comes Fred McChesney, in Money for Nothing: Politi
cians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, to say that the rent
creation story cannot stand alone; it is but a part of a larger and
more powerful economic theory of regulation based upon rent
extraction.
Mcchesney demonstrates first that the rent-creation model of
regulation is deficient in several respects (pp. 17-19). As an empiri
cal matter, it is incapable of explaining the great wave of health,
safety, environmental, and consumer-oriented regulation that be
gan to emerge in the late 1960s and continues even now. In those
instances, regulation simply did not create rents for the regulated
industry - although it did benefit others, such as manufacturers of
pollution control equipment, who may well have participated in the
legislative process. Moreover, even well-organized industries were
unable to resist the imposition of sometimes very costly measures
while individuals, particularly in the case of environmental regu
lation, were able to organize effectively notwithstanding their large
number and small stakes.
Second, and more fundamentally, the rent-creation model im
plicitly treats politicians as passive players: "they do not actively
enter the market for rents with their own demands" (p. 17). This
aspect of the model, no doubt a carryover from the "consumer
sovereignty model of private markets" (p. 17), closes off an area
ripe for analysis. We all know that politicians need and actively
seek out both votes and campaign contributions; economists can
hardly ignore, therefore, the possibility that politicians seek out, or
otherwise create, opportunities to use the legislative process in ful
fillment of those needs. Finally, the model does not attend "to ways
other than rent creation that a politician can obtain benefits from
private individuals" (p. 18). Perhaps principal among those is the
"ability of politicians to gain . . . by causing losses to others" (p. 19),
or, alternatively, by threatening to do so but forbearing when
appeased.
Thus does McChesney introduce his model of economic regu
lation, in which rent creation is but a special case of politicians
seeking to maximize their benefits from the legislative process. His
more general proposition is that politicians have the opportunity to
gain whenever they can credibly threaten to extract existing rents
from private hands, whether those of producers or of consumers.
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When all goes well, the threat will not have to be exercised: the
threatened party will pay the politician to forbear from regulating,
handing over a portion of the rents rather than losing all of them.
When regulation does occur, therefore, it is because this process of
threat, appeasement, and forbearance has failed. Perhaps trans
action costs were insurmountable, or one side or the other behaved
opportunistically.
Clearly the opportunities for rent extraction abound, whereas
the opportunities for rent creation are more limited. In any case,
the relevant question, as McChesney poses it from the point of view
of the legislator, is what strategy maximizes his revenue (pp. 22-23).
Depending upon the particulars of the case, the most promising
strategy may be offering to create rents for Industry A, threatening
to extract rents from Industry B, or threatening to extract rents
from Consumers C.
McChesney identifies two general methods for rent extraction.
The first is to threaten producers with a price reduction (or what is
functionally the same thing, withdrawal of a privilege or permit pre
viously granted by the state) (pp. 26-28); the second is to threaten
to raise the industry's cost by imposing upon it some regulatory
burden (p. 29). For both types of legislative proposal, McChesney
adopts the term "milker bills," used by California legislators to de
scribe legislative proposals that are intended not to pass, but to
elicit contributions from those who would like to make sure they do
not pass (pp. 29-30). (In other state capitols, they are reportedly
called "cash cows," "juice bills," and "fetchers.")
The phenomenon of legislation that is proposed for the purpose
not of being enacted but of being bought off brings to mind a per
sonal observation. In the mid-1980s, some members of Congress,
borrowing an idea then current in the law reviews, proposed to
amend the securities laws so as to require a federal rather than a
state charter for some class of publicly owned corporations. The
point of the proposal was nominally to assert federal control over
various takeover tactics and defenses in the interest of preserving
the integrity of the securities market. The intended effect was to
insulate the managements of target companies from hostile take
overs, at the expense of both their shareholders and those of the
acquiring companies. As the Reagan Administration's monitor of
this legislation, I could only conclude at the time that, while the bills
may not have been conceived as milker bills, they were surely pur
sued as such once the members realized how lucrative they could
be. Publicly traded corporations on both sides of the issue, which is
to say tender offerors and takeover targets, began furiously throw
ing favors at thy relevant Congressmen for at least a few years while
the threat (or promise) of legislation seemed credible. Then the
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idea dropped off the legislative agenda for no discernible reason.
But I digress.
McChesney is quick to point out that rent extraction is socially
costly, albeit perhaps less so than rent creation. "Even if politicians
eventually allow themselves to be bought off, their minatory pres
ence reduces the expected value of entrepreneurial ability and
specific-capital investments" (p. 33). The results are to diminish the
value of existing capital and reduce the incentive to invest; to in
duce an inefficient preference for investment in "politically more
mobile" (meaning less firm-specific) forms of capital and in under
ground economic activity; and to incur the bargaining and other
transaction costs of the extractive process (pp. 33-34). These in
clude the costs of the legislative process (hearings, etc.) insofar as
they are incurred solely to make legislative threats credible, and the
time of lawyers, lobbyists, and legislators (assuming there is a so
cially positive opportunity cost for legislators' time) (p. 34).
McChesney elaborates the theory in several respects that we
need not rehearse here. Suffice it to say, he analyzes the relative
attraction of rent creation, as opposed to rent extraction, as a func
tion of the elasticity of industry supply (pp. 34-36); explains how the
legislative auction serves to elicit valuable information concerning
the relative value of regulatory action versus inaction (pp. 36-37);
examines the benefits of employing expert administrative agencies
to extract rents from specialized industries (p. 37); and analyzes the
problem of opportunistic behavior by politicians and their custom
ers using the familiar heuristic of a game modeled upon the
Prisoner's Dilemma (pp. 38-41). This leads him to the empirical
question: "[D]o private actors in fact pay significant sums to induce
government not to act?" (p. 42).
The foregoing describes Part I of the book. In Part II, "Demon
strations," McChesney offers such evidence as he can for the de
scriptive validity of the model. Chapters are devoted respectively
to anecdotal evidence, empirical tests, and application of the model
to changes in the rate at which the Internal Revenue Code is
amended.
The Chapter on anecdotal evidence, entitled "Observing Extor
tion: The Practice of Rent Extraction" (pp. 45-68), is not particu
larly satisfying. It consists of alternately pointing out the ways in
which politicians can legally profit personally from campaign contri
butions, honoraria for speaking engagements, and in-kind benefits;
and providing accounts of some instances in which threats to lower
prices or increase costs were made, to the great consternation of the
affected industries, but later abandoned. There is little attempt to
gather "testimony" from those who have firsthand knowledge of
what intervened between the threat and the forbearance. One can
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only sympathize with the author's plight, however; such evidence is
inherently difficult to come by, notwithstanding the lawfulness of
the transactions. (How many miles of unexplored caves are there?)
Perhaps the most suggestive alternative to the direct evidence
upon which McChesney draws (pp. 66-68) is the analogy to under
developed countries, in which rent extraction is practiced more
openly, whether by the ruling individuals acting upon their own be
half, or by the government acting as their agent. While there is no
confusing a violent and corrupt environment in which foreign inves
tors must pay to avoid everything from strikes to nationalization,
and a highly developed country in which rents are extracted law
fully and without violence, it is hard to believe that people who
occupy positions of power do not exploit them in similar ways,
though by different means, the world over.
The Chapter entitled "Validating the Model: Empirical Tests of
Rent Extraction" (pp. 69 85), is only slightly more satisfying. Here
McChesney reports the results of studies looking at the wealth ef
fect generated by the cycle of threat and forbearance. In particular,
he recounts a study of Canadian firms that were the subjects of ad
verse legislative threats later abandoned (pp. 73-77). The results
are "consistent with the strongest form of the rent extraction
model" (p. 76). Although announcement of the threat depressed
the prices of the affected firms' shares, retraction of the threats did
not cause the firms' shares to recover their lost market value. "The
implication is either that politicians were correctly expected to ex
tract nearly all the rents, or that failure to negotiate a payoff was
considered to be a remote possibility" (p. 77).
-

Relatedly, Mcchesney examines the effect that the Clinton
Administration's health care proposals had upon the value of
shares in pharmaceutical companies (pp. 77-78). "It is particularly
interesting that the November 1994 Republican electoral victory
did not restore to pharmaceutical firms the wealth they had lost. In
the end, the threatened firms had paid good money for nothing:
their wealth was diminished, and no legislation was passed" (p. 78).
In other words, the threat was raised, the wealth was shared, and
the threat was abandoned, leaving the nominally unregulated firms
poorer if not wiser.
Event studies of this sort are unavoidably subject to certain criti
cisms and qualifications, the significance of which can be dimin
ished only if enough subsequent studies tum up similar results.
What McChesney has already done, however, is sufficiently sug
gestive to warrant those further studies.
Finally, in Part III, "Extensions," McChesney takes up the im
plications of his work for various fields of inquiry. In particular, he
devotes chapters to optimal taxation (pp. 113-32), interest group or-
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ganization (pp. 133-55), and the prospects for improving the model
and addressing additional issues (pp. 156-70). The chapter on opti
mal taxation is full of interesting insights. For instance, McChesney
explains why government services subject to user fees, such as graz
ing rights on federal lands and USDA meat and poultry inspections,
are chronically underpriced (pp. 120-24). Underpricing causes gov
ernments to deliver services to the few at a loss borne by the many
(all taxpayers), but enables politicians to threaten the few with an
increase in user charges. McChesney also analyzes tax funds that
are "earmarked" for a specific purpose (pp. 124-31). The supposed
beneficiaries have no enforceable property rights in the funds and
must compete, by conferring the usual emoluments, to get politi
cians to release the money for its intended purpose. Examples
abound, but perhaps the most familiar in recent years has been the
difficulty that airport authorities have had getting access to the
"trust fund" established to finance airport construction.
On the costs and benefits of interest group organization,
McChesney's analysis is particularly intriguing. He points out that
being organized itself has costs and benefits. Only the organized
can effectively fork over the payment necessary to obtain regulation
- or to avoid it.
Organization increases the ability to add to the group's surplus by
becoming a transferee of others' surplus. Though once organized, a
particular group will always offer more to keep its own surplus than
competing groups will pay to have it transferred; organizing therefore
gives politicians greater incentives to threaten a group's existing sur
plus. [pp. 151-52]

There is much more on the subject of interest group organization,
but the foregoing point is enough to illustrate the productivity of
McChesney's thesis; everywhere he looks with the aid of his model,
he sees things in a new light.
Not the least interesting is the observation with which he closes
the chapter on interest group organization:
In the absence of transaction costs, all regulatory activity would be rent
extraction. Existing owners of rights to future capital flows or present
wealth will always pay at least as much, and usually more, to keep
what they have rather than have it transferred away. Regulation en
sues only when the transaction costs of avoiding expropriation - of
achieving a rent-extraction contract - prove prohibitive.
. . . To say that regulation occurred is to say that someone who
valued the resources more - their owner in the current period failed to acquire them for the subsequent period. In other words, reg
ulation is proof of failure in the market for political contracts. That
regulation represents political market failure is terribly ironic; not so
long ago economists were analyzing regulation as a result of private
market failure. [pp. 154-55]
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The irony is terrible and delicious, especially for those of us who
have long believed that market failure is a rare beast indeed.14
In his final chapter, McChesney identifies outstanding issues to
which he has no present answers. For example, why are the rents of
some groups and not of others extracted (pp. 159-61)? Why do we
sometimes see parties on both sides of a rent transfer issue paying
politicians when only one side can win (pp. 161-62)? And perhaps
most intriguing of all, why is it that "politicians' returns from rent
extraction are so small, relative to the expropriable wealth
threatened" (p. 162)? One prior study estimated that politicians
skimmed only about five percent of the wealth they transferred (p.
163). The situation reminds McChesney of the relative gains to bid
ding and target firms in corporate takeovers; bidding firms drive up
the premium paid for the shares of the target and in the end realize
only modest profits themselves. Perhaps a more suggestive analogy
is to spies, who typically receive payments that are very modest rel
ative to the value of the secrets they transfer. Are politicians, like
spies, constrained by the need not to live too well, lest they attract
unwanted attention - in this case from voters? Or is the relevant
constraint imposed by voters not upon how they live, for most of
the proceeds go into campaign expenditures, but upon how much
they collect from any one industry?
Alternatively, perhaps the relatively low level of rents extracted
merely reflects competition at work. Legislators must compete
among themselves for the available rents. (Even a small legislative
body has too many members to form an effective cartel.) In a
chamber of 100, for example, in order to prevail a purchaser need
accumulate only fifty-one votes, which may be had on the cheap if
the opposing interest is not organized and actively acquiring votes
in opposition to the proposal. The result may be fairly low prices
except where a matter is hotly contested between two (or more)
private interests. I am aware of no literature on the subject, but my
impression is that legislators raise more money, other things being
equal, from issues in which there are contending industries involved
(such as banks versus insurance agents) than from those in which a
single industry is seeking legislation without encountering signifi
cant opposition.
Curiously, McChesney does not develop the implications of his
theory for relationships among legislators. Consider: if Legislator
A puts forward a milker bill, the gains from those who contribute to
make it go away will accrue not only to A, but to others on the
relevant committee and to anyone else that may be able to suppress
the bill. In other words, the author of the milker bill cannot secure
14. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. &
11 {1973).
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the full benefits that it generates (which is not to suggest there is an
inefficiently small number of milker bills as a result). Viewed the
other way around, Legislator A's bill is an opportunity for
Legislator B, who can profit from opposing or supporting it, which
ever is more lucrative. Indeed, how can A be sure a bill will fetch
significant returns to him rather than to his colleagues?
Questions like these will no doubt command the attention of a
phalanx of public choice theorists for some time to come. Indeed,
McChesney has in his book dictated an important research agenda
for the future. Lawyers, economists, and especially doctoral stu
dents should be duly grateful. Which reminds me of another story,
one that I heard when I was still teaching law. A colleague in the
mathematics department had brought back as a graduate student a
young prodigy he had encountered during a sabbatical abroad. A
couple of years later, when asked how his protege was doing, the
professor replied somewhat gloomily, "Well, he has solved several
problems that hadn't been solved before, but he just isn't asking
questions that no one can answer." McChesney is doing both.

